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O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L  M O D E L I N G
You’ve Optimized Your Process …
Now Optimize Your Organization
Maj. Joel J. Hagan, USAF • Capt. William G. Slack, USMC
Col. John Dillard, USA (Ret.) • Roxanne Zolin
So you’ve tried everything you can think of to im-prove your organization’s production processes.You’ve identified bottlenecks through Theory ofConstraints; you’ve eliminated wasteful processthrough Lean techniques such as process mapping;
and you’ve decreased variation by plotting control charts
as part of your Six-Sigma program. Your results have been
impressive, but you want to do better. What’s the next
step? What else can you do to improve? 
Those were the questions asked by leadership of the Naval
Air Station (NAS) Lemoore Aircraft Intermediate Mainte-
nance Division (AIMD) in January 2006. Was there more
that could be done? The answer was yes! 
The NAS Lemoore AIMD is responsible for maintenance
of F/A-18C/D/E/F aircraft. Over the past several years, the
AIMD had implemented a full-court-press on improving
their maintenance processes under the AIRSpeed pro-
gram—a Navy program focused on implementing process
improvement techniques such as Theory of Constraints,
Lean, and Six-Sigma in order to improve weapon system
operational availability. The successes NAS Lemoore AIMD
had achieved through AIRSpeed placed it at the leading
edge in this Navy process improvement effort. Not satis-
fied with past successes, the AIMD teamed with the Grad-
uate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval
Postgraduate School to investigate the utility of less tra-
ditional, yet potentially beneficial tools for improving F/A-
18 maintenance. 
The tool we chose to investigate was computational or-
ganizational modeling. Specifically, we chose to investi-
gate applying the Virtual Design Team computational or-
ganizational modeling techniques developed by Dr.
Raymond Levitt at Stanford University based on J. R. Gal-
braith’s theories on information processing, and imple-
mented using the POWer software version 1.1.6, a soft-
ware program developed and maintained by Stanford
University. The tool of organizational modeling differs
from the AIRSpeed tools in that it focuses not on the item
moving through the organization (such as an aircraft or
engine), but instead on the flow of information through
the organization. 
Computational Organizational Modeling
Computational organizational modeling is a tool that helps
managers design an organization. The concept of orga-
nizational design is relatively new and differs from the
more traditional approach of simply allowing an organi-
zation to incrementally evolve in response to external and
internal forces. Traditionally, when managers have been
asked to take on new tasks or improve the output of tasks
already assigned, they often considered modifying their
organization to meet the new challenges. Unfortunately,
their methods for assessing the impact of proposed or-
ganizational changes were at best heuristic rules of thumb
employing minimal scientific rigor. In other words, they
were taking their best guess at how a reorganization would
impact overall performance. Although the result of this
less-than-structured methodology was—for the very best
of managers—considered acceptable, the reality is that
not all of us are the best of managers and there’s no crys-
tal ball allowing us to predict the impact of our actions.
In public organizations, prediction is even more difficult
because of the lack of market feedback through pricing
mechanisms. 
Most organizations would benefit from a clear path to
evaluating the impact of organizational change. Compu-
tational organizational modeling provides that clear path
by allowing managers to build detailed organizational
models on their desktop computers, then modify the mod-
els to assess the effects of proposed organizational
changes. Once they identify an organizational structure
that results in the desired performance, they can imple-
ment the relevant changes. This is a far better approach
than the more common trial-and-error method—make a
change, see how it works, and then make another change. 
Modeling NAS Lemoore AIMD
In the fall of 2006, the NAS Lemoore AIMD 400 Division
became the sole continental U.S. organization responsi-
ble for F414 engine intermediate maintenance. As the
power plant for the Navy’s newest fighter aircraft F/A-
18E/F, AIMD production throughput of this engine was
identified by leadership as a prime candidate for our im-
provement effort. Decreasing throughput time for the en-
gine would enhance the operational availability of the
F/A-18E/F. 
Methodology
To improve F414 throughput, we first developed an or-
ganizational model of the 400 Division. We then validated
that model, comparing predicted organizational perfor-
mance to actual performance. Finally, we modified the
model to represent various organizational changes in
order to determine which changes reduced maintenance
time. 
Model Development
The modeling techniques employed in this study required
us to clearly identify three components of the 400 Divi-
sion: tasks associated with F414 maintenance; person-
nel assigned to accomplish those tasks; and key com-
munications paths within the organization.
Figure 1 illustrates the F414 maintenance process. In the
Acceptance phase, the engine is inspected to identify
maintenance accomplished at the squadron level. This
information is then compared against information con-
tained in the engine logbook as well as the Aircraft En-
gine Management System database employed by the Sim-
ilar to Automated Maintenance Environment (SAME)
software application. If there are discrepancies, 400 Di-
vision administration personnel resolve the issue with the
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FIGURE 1. F414 Engine Intermediate Maintenance Process
squadron. Historically, this process takes, on average, 14
days. Following Acceptance, engine maintenance per-
sonnel conduct a major engine inspection and tear down
the engine. Inoperative engine modules are identified and
sent to the Navy Depot at Jacksonville, Fla. In the build-
up phase, inoperative modules are replaced and the en-
gine is reassembled. The engine is then run in the test
cell through a set of pre-programmed cycles during the
test phase. If the engine fails, it may be fixed at the test
cell, returned to the maintenance hanger to the build-up
phase or—in rare instances—sent back to the teardown
phase. Following testing, a post-test inspection determines
if damage to the engine occurred in the test cell. Finally,
in RFI (ready for issue) stage, paperwork is completed
and the engine is deemed RFI back to the squadron.
Within each phase described above, there are numerous
tasks that we have not detailed because of space con-
straints; all these tasks were modeled in terms of the time
and skills required of an individual to accomplish them.
Once we had identified the tasks required to accomplish
F414 maintenance, we identified the people responsible
for accomplishing the tasks. The positions these person-
nel fill are presented in Figure 2. 
Personnel were characterized in terms of their skills, ex-
perience, and available time to accomplish tasks. Accu-
rately characterizing personnel was important, since many
times, excessively long maintenance stems from mis-
matches between an individual’s skills, experience, and
available time compared with what is required by a task. 
It is important to note that Figure 2 does not present a
chain of command, but instead a chain of information
flow within the 400 Division. Differentiating between
them is critical, since within the Division—as in many or-
ganizations—an individual doesn’t necessarily go to the
next person in the chain of command to get resolution
on a problem. Information regarding problems may flow
to another individual. Our modeling required us to char-
acterize how information would flow in an organization
to solve a problem, since it is though improving this flow
that problems associated with task execution can more
quickly be resolved; tasks can hence be accomplished
more quickly. 
Our final modeling step was to identify paths of infor-
mation flow. Daily meetings held to coordinate mainte-
nance actions were key paths for information flow. Along
with the primary coordination meeting held daily at 7
a.m., personnel associated with specific positions, (i.e.,
controllers, engine maintenance, and supply), held morn-
ing and afternoon meetings to coordinate the efforts for
their specialty. Meetings are, of course, a two-edged sword.
They are great for transferring information, but they also
take time away from accomplishing tasks. As part of our
organizational modeling effort, we wanted to character-
ize this information flow and determine the utility of meet-
ings currently being held by Division. 
Model Validation
In our study, we did not attempt to prove the validity of
the virtual design team modeling techniques employed.
Instead we accepted the validation results of previous
studies. We did, however, validate our particular model
of the 400 Division by comparing the actual and mod-
eled F414 maintenance throughput durations. As the pri-
mary metric of interest in this study, we felt that if the ac-
tual maintenance throughput time closely matched the
model predicted time, we had developed an accurate
model of the Division. The average actual time required
to accomplish F414 maintenance was 21.77 days while
the model predicted 21.09 days. With only a 3 percent
difference, we felt our model accurately represented the
400 Division. 
Model Interventions
Once validated, we modified the model,
evaluating potential changes or inter-
ventions to the 400 Division that may
reduce F414 throughput time. Among
others, we considered the following five
interventions. 
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FIGURE 2. 400 Division Personnel
Paralleling engine acceptance process: As shown in Fig-
ure 1, the current acceptance process must be completed
prior to conducting other maintenance actions. This in-
tervention evaluates the impact of conducting this effort
in parallel with all other maintenance actions. 
Combining the administration and controller positions:
As shown in Figure 2, these are currently separate posi-
tions. This intervention was the result of interviews with
400 Division personnel, where it was suggested that ad-
ministration personnel could, with some additional train-
ing, do the same work as controller personnel. This in-
tervention evaluates this assertion.
Decreasing centralization: One of the effects of imple-
menting the AIRSpeed tools is decentralizing organiza-
tional control. Although this is normally considered ben-
eficial, there are drawbacks to decentralization in terms
of rework when poor decisions are made at lower levels.
This intervention evaluates this tradeoff.
Combining meetings: Since the F414 maintenance tasks
are well defined and accomplished by highly skilled per-
sonnel, we hypothesized that 400 Division personnel may
not need as many coordination meetings. With this in-
tervention, we wanted to evaluate the tradeoff between
having more meetings resulting in better information flow
and fewer meetings resulting in more time to conduct
engine maintenance. Specifically, we combined all of the
morning meetings into one meeting attended by all per-
sonnel, and separately combined all of the afternoon
meetings also attended by all personnel. 
Decreasing meeting duration and frequency: Here we
evaluated the tradeoff between longer, more frequent
meetings, which reduce the risk of re-work resulting from
inaccurate information transfer; and shorter, less frequent
meetings, which afford greater time to conduct engine
maintenance. We focused on the key 400 Division coor-
dination meeting, which currently oc-
curs every day at 7 a.m., evaluating
30 combinations of meeting duration
and frequency. 
Figure 3 presents the impact of the
interventions presented above as pre-
dicted by our model. The critical met-
ric was project duration. Did these in-
terventions increase or decrease the
time required to conduct the F414
maintenance? At the same time, we
were also concerned with how these
interventions impacted the risk of ac-
complishing each task associated with
F414 maintenance. Risk is quantified
in terms of the amount of mainte-
nance rework required as a result of
such issues as skills mismatches, inadequate time avail-
able to accomplish tasks, and insufficient information to
accomplish tasks. As a result of the complex nature of
the algorithms employed to quantify risk, an in-depth dis-
cussion of this assessment is not within the scope of this
article. 
The first intervention, paralleling the acceptance process,
decreased engine throughput time by 58.6 hours. Al-
though the risk of administration personnel failing to com-
plete tasks associated with the acceptance process in-
creased slightly, we assess the significant benefit of
decreased project duration outweighs this risk. 
In contrast to the first intervention, the second interven-
tion, combining the administration and controller posi-
tions, had an adverse impact on both project duration (in-
creasing it by 56.7 hours) and on risk. We believe the
benefits of specialization drove this result. 
Decreasing centralization, the third intervention, reduced
maintenance throughput duration by 4.4 hours but had
no significant impact on risk. We believe this benefit
comes about because F414 maintenance consists of well-
defined tasks accomplished by highly skilled personnel.
The benefits of decreasing the time required to make de-
cisions by pushing decision authority to lower levels out-
weigh the potential risk of poor decisions resulting in re-
work. 
The fourth intervention, separately combining the 400
Division morning and afternoon meetings, also decreased
project duration, specifically by 7.3 hours, while having
no significant impact on the risk of accomplishing main-
tenance tasks. This result is somewhat intuitive when you
consider that if everyone in the organization is going to
attend at least one morning meeting and one afternoon
meeting, it makes sense to have everyone in the same
meeting. Each individual consumes the same amount of
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FIGURE 3. Impact of Interventions
time, and the risk of misinterpreting information pre-
sented in the meeting and then passing it down to sub-
ordinates is decreased. 
Finally, the fifth intervention identified a benefit from de-
creasing meeting frequency to every other day. While
there was no benefit to increasing meeting duration,
decreasing meeting frequency decreased maintenance
time by 6.6 hours. We believe that this benefit is the re-
sult of F414 maintenance consisting of well-defined tasks
accomplished by highly skilled personnel. There were
greater benefits to spending more time working on en-
gines than coordinating maintenance efforts and trans-
ferring information in meetings every day. 
Impact of Computational Organizational
Modeling
Before having an organizational model, the 400 Division
leadership’s only method for evaluating the impact of
these five interventions on F414 engine throughput was
to sit around a conference table talking over their best es-
timates based on previous experience. Although such dis-
cussions are helpful, they’re more productive when based
on quantifiable information. A computational organiza-
tional model provided 400 Division leadership with the
opportunity to evaluate these changes, quantify the im-
pact, and determine if the potential benefits were worth
the risks of making the organizational change. Without
this capability, leadership might forego certain organiza-
tional changes because they are unable to quantify the
benefit when the risk of change is high. At the same time,
they may also choose to make an organizational change
that on the surface appears beneficial, but later realize
there were significant second-order effects that erase any
perceived benefit. In short, an organizational model pro-
vides leadership with a tool for making informed deci-
sions about organizational change.
Our research shows that computational organizational
modeling—like the tools associated with Theory of Con-
straints, Lean, and Six-Sigma—can help managers iden-
tify opportunities for improving their organizations. Com-
putational organizational modeling differs from those
logistics tools, however, in that it focuses on how to im-
prove organizational performance by optimizing the flow
of information through the organization. Computational
organizational modeling can allow managers to quantify
the complicated interactions associated with tasks and
personnel in an organization, and determine how best to
align personnel with tasks in order to accomplish their
mission.
The authors welcome comments and questions. Con-
tact Hagan at tpsfte@aol.com; Slack at aorbslack@
hotmail.com; Dillard at jdillard@nps.edu; and Zolin
at rvzolin@nps.edu.
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LETTERS.
We Like Letters.
You’ve just finished reading an article in Defense
AT&L, and you have something to add from your
own experience. Or maybe you have an opposing
viewpoint.
Don’t keep it to yourself—share it with other
Defense AT&L readers by sending a letter to the
editor. We’ll print your comments in our “From
Our Readers” department and possibly ask the
author to respond.
If you don’t have time to write an entire article, a
letter in Defense AT&L is a good way to get your
point across to the acquisition, technology, and
logistics workforce.
E-mail letters to the managing editor:
datl(at)dau(dot)mil.
Defense AT&L reserves the right to edit letters for length
and to refuse letters that are deemed unsuitable for
publication.
